FREEDOMPOST, a lawyer's commentary

A LAWYER'S ARGUMENT FOR REVISITING MARBURY V MADISON

Every law student learns in his first class on American Constitutional Law, the Supreme Court case styled "Marbury v. Madison", penned the then Chief Justice John Marshal. There is no express provision in the Consitution that a Court, even the Supreme Court had the power to review and Act of Congress on constitutional grounds. Disregarding the lack of a writing Chief Justice, created out of whole cloth the principle of "Judicial Review" empowering the Supreme Court to review an Act of Congress to determine whether the Act of Congress exceeded its authority under the separation of powers principles of our three branch national government. It was audacious for Chief Justice Marshal to state that the Supreme Court possessed such a power. We lawyers always assumed that such a power existed since the Supreme Court had been reviewing acts of Congress as either constitutional or unconstitutional instead of just ironing out the differences between the litigants based on "INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW" as jsxtaposed to constitutionality. Andrew Jackson fiercly opposed such a concept.

HAS THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDGE MADE LAW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TRAVELLED TOO FAR THAT THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT ITS CONCEPT.

For anyone who still thought legal conservatives are dedicated to judicial restraint, the oral arguments before the Supreme Court on the health care case should put that idea to rest. There has been no court less restrained in signaling its willingness to replace law made by Congress with law made by justices.

This should not be surprising. Republican administrations, spurred by conservative interest groups since the 1980s, handpicked each of the conservative justices to reshape or strike down law that fails to reflect conservative political ideology.

When Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy were selected by the Reagan administration, the goal was to choose judges who would be eager to undo liberal precedents. By the time John Roberts Jr. and Samuel Alito Jr. were selected in the second Bush administration, judicial “restraint” was no longer an aim among conservatives. They were chosen because their professional records showed that they would advance a political ideology that limits government and promotes market freedoms, with less regard to the general welfare.

There is an enormous distinction to be made between the approaches of the Roberts court and the Warren court, which conservatives have long railed against for being an activist court. For one thing, Republican-appointed justices who led that court, Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan Jr., were not selected to effect constitutional change as part of their own political agenda.

During an era of major social tumult, when the public’s attitudes about racial equality, fairness in the workings of democracy and the dignity of the individual proved incompatible with old precedents, those centrists led the court to take new positions in carrying out democratic principles. Yet they were extremely mindful of the need to maintain the court’s legitimacy, and sought unanimity in major rulings. Cooper v. Aaron, the 1958 landmark case that said states are bound by Supreme Court rulings, was unanimous. So was Katzenbach v. McClung, the 1964 case upholding the constitutionality of parts of the Civil Rights Act under the commerce clause.

The four moderates on the court have a leftish bent, but they see their role as stewards of the law, balancing the responsibility to enforce the Constitution through judicial review against the duty to show deference to the will of the political branches. In that respect, they and the conservatives seem to be following entirely different rules.

That difference is playing out in the health care case. Established precedents support broad authority for Congress to regulate national commerce, and the health care market is unquestionably national in scope. Yet to Justice Kennedy the mandate requiring most Americans to obtain health insurance represents “a step beyond what our cases have allowed, the affirmative duty to act, to go into commerce.” To Justice Stephen Breyer, it’s clear that “if there are substantial effects on interstate commerce, Congress can act.”

Likewise, Justice Scalia’s willingness to delve into health care politics seems utterly alien to his moderate colleagues. On the question of what would happen if the mandate were struck down, Justice Scalia launched into a senatorial vote count: “You can’t repeal the rest of the act because you’re not going to get 60 votes in the Senate to repeal the rest.” Justice Breyer, by contrast, said firmly: “I would stay out of politics. That’s for Congress; not us.”

If the conservatives decide that they can sidestep the Constitution to negate Congress’s choices on crucial national policies, the court’s legitimacy — and the millions of Americans who don’t have insurance — will pay a very heavy price. Chief Justice Roberts has the opportunity to avoid this disastrous outcome by forging even a narrow ruling to uphold the mandate and the rest of the law. A split court striking down the act will be declaring itself virtually unfettered by the law. And if that happens along party lines, with five Republican-appointed justices supporting the challenge led by 26 Republican governors, the court will mark itself as driven by politics.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is full of itself and wields too much power beyond all bounderies contemplated by our founders. A limit must be imposed but by whom. Constitutional Amendment? What is it in the Constution that the Court does not understand. Nothing. They have usurped power and we wimps have let them. Gore never should have paid attention to a wacky political court selling the Presidency to Bush. We Americans have paid a stiff price for that overreach.

Martin S. Friedlander, Esq.

 

GRASSLEY SCREWED YOU IN 2005 AND HE IS SCREWING YOU IN 2009.

Opening Statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley at the Bankruptcy Reform Hearing

 

Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased the bankruptcy bill is on the Judiciary Committee agenda and that we are scheduled to mark up this bill next week. The bipartisan legislation I just introduced as S. 256 is nearly identical to the 107th Congress H.R. 333 Conference Report signed by Senator Leahy, but voted down in the other body. The only difference is that I've removed the poison pill abortion amendment. All of the other compromises made at the request of our Democratic colleagues have been preserved intact in this bill.

As many of you know, we've been working on the issue of bankruptcy reform for a number of years now-since the mid 1990's. When I started working on this issue, it was considered a scandal that bankruptcies might reach 1.4 million. Guess what? In 2004, there were 1.6 million. Congress has wasted time and we still have a bankruptcy crisis on our hands.

By way of background, both Houses demonstrated overwhelming margins in favor of this bipartisan bill in 2000, but President Clinton pocket-vetoed the legislation and we simply ran out of time in the session to override the veto. In the 107th Congress, I re-introduced the bankruptcy bill and it passed the Senate overwhelmingly, with numerous changes to satisfy Democrats. We then went to conference with the House, and further concessions were made. The conference committee report language was the result of a long process of bipartisan negotiations that culminated in agreement on over four hundred pages of legislative text. Ultimately, we had a signed conference report supported by our Ranking Member.

Given that the language we are considering is the same as the 107th Congress conference report signed off on by our Democratic friends - minus the poison pill - I'm hopeful that we can all stand by the compromises we reached in good faith. We all cooperated and compromised on this legislation. It provides new consumer protections, helps children in need of child support, and makes other necessary reforms to a system that is open to abuse. There is no need to re-open this bill.

As we hear from witnesses today, I recall the broad public support for reforming our bankruptcy system. The vast majority of people believe that individuals who file for bankruptcy should be required to pay back some of their debts if they have the means to do so.

This is precisely what the bankruptcy reform legislation does.

Most people think it should be more difficult for people to file for bankruptcy. Americans have had enough; they are tired of paying for high rollers who game the current system and its loopholes to get out of paying their fair share.

This legislation eliminates some of the opportunities for abuse that exist under the current system. Our current system allows wealthy people to continue to abuse the system at the expense of everyone else. People with good incomes can run up massive debts and then use bankruptcy to get out of honoring them.

All of us end up paying for the unscrupulous who abuse the system. In fact, it has been estimated that every American family pays as much as $550 a year in a hidden tax as a result of the actions from these abuses. My bankruptcy reform legislation will help eliminate this hidden tax by implementing a means test to make wealthy people who can repay their debts actually honor them. I suppose we can call this a tax cut for the responsible people in America.

Bankruptcy abuse hurts our nation's small businesses. We will hear today about how small businesses have been hurt by losses due to bankruptcy. When businesses absorb these losses, they have to make up for the loss somehow through higher prices, or by laying off employees or going out of business.

The bankruptcy crisis is a jobs crisis. Making American's businesses stronger helps all of us - especially those in need of a job.

Make no mistake, misrepresentations about this legislation have been running rampant by those who oppose any meaningful bankruptcy reform. I've been in politics a long time, and I know that political criticism is never inhibited by ignorance. For instance, the statistical analysis in the U.S. Trustee's office examined over 5000 bankruptcy cases and found that under one-half listed medical debts of any sort. And those filers who did list medical debts, on average, listed under $5000 in medical debts.

So much for the myth that most bankruptcies are driven medical costs. The fact is there are abusers out there. The fact is S. 256 doesn't harm bankrupts with large medical debts.

Let's stop the abuse. Let's return to common sense. Let's enact bankruptcy reform now, before the abuse gets worse.

The reality is that the bankruptcy reform bill does not deny anyone access to bankruptcy relief; it just requires those who have the means to repay debts based on their income to do so. It's that simple. I look forward to quick Committee action and quick floor action on this bill.

COMMENT by Martin S. Friedlander, Esq.

He is one pious son of a bitch. Listen to his BS about pulling the plug on Grandma. The Democrats should pull the plug on Grassley since most bankruptcies are caused by uninsured sick people. He favors bringing guns to Washington before violence erupts.

Give him the "heave ho".

Martin S Friedlander, Esq.

BUSH STASHES HIS CRONIES IN THE HONEYPOT CALLED FEMA

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Neigh to Cronies

By MAUREEN DOWD

WASHINGTON

I understand that politicians are wont to put cronies and cupcakes on the payroll.

I just wish they'd stop putting them on the Homeland Security payroll.

Can't they stick their pals who failed at business in the Small Business Administration and their tomatoes over at the Oilseeds and Rice Bureau of the Ag Department?

At least Bill Clinton knew not to stash his sweeties in jobs concerned with keeping the nation safe. Gennifer Flowers said that Mr. Clinton got her a $17,500 job in Arkansas in the state unemployment agency, though she was ranked ninth out of 11 applicants tested. And Monica Lewinsky's thong expertise led her to a job as an assistant to the Pentagon press officer.

Gov. James McGreevey of New Jersey had to resign last year after acknowledging that he had elevated his patronage peccadillo, an Israeli poet named Golan Cipel, to be his special assistant on homeland security without even a background check or American citizenship. Mr. Cipel, however, was vastly qualified for his job compared with Michael Brown, who didn't know the difference between a tropical depression and an anxiety attack when President Bush charged him with life-and-death decisions.

W. trusted Brownie simply because he was a friend of a friend. He was a college buddy of Joe Allbaugh, who worked as W.'s chief of staff when he was Texas governor and as his 2000 presidential campaign manager.

It sounds more like a Vince Vaughn-Owen Wilson flick than the story of a man who was to be responsible for the fate of the Republic during the biggest natural disaster in our history. Brownie was a failed former lawyer with a degree from a semiaccredited law school, as The New Republic put it, when he moved to Colorado in 1991 to judge horse judges for the Arabian Horse Association.

He was put out to pasture under pressure in 2001, leaving him free to join his pal Mr. Allbaugh at an eviscerated FEMA. Mr. Allbaugh decided to leave the top job at FEMA and become a lobbyist with clients like Halliburton when the agency was reorganized under Homeland Security, stripping it of authority. Why not, Mr. Allbaugh thought, just pass this obscure sinecure to his homeboy?

Time magazine reported that Brownie's official bio described his only stint in emergency management as "assistant city manager" in Edmond, Okla. But a city official told Time that the FEMA chief had been "an assistant to the city manager," which was "more like an intern."

Ever since W. was his father's loyalty enforcer, his political decisions have been shaped more by loyalty than substance or competence. Mr. Bush never did warm up to his first secretary of state because Colin Powell rebuffed appeals to help out in the Tallahassee recount of 2000.

The breakdown in management and communications was so execrable that the president learned about the 25,000 desperate, trapped people at the New Orleans convention center not from Brownie, who didn't know himself, but from a wire story carried into the Oval Office by an aide on Thursday, 24 hours after the victims had been pleading and crying for help on every channel. (Maybe tomorrow the aide will come in with a wire story, "No W.M.D. in Iraq.")

"Getting truth on the ground in New Orleans was very difficult," a White House aide told The Times's Elisabeth Bumiller. Not if you had a TV.

As Mexican troops arrived in Texas to help with Katrina refugees, Brownie was recalled to Washington, where he said he wanted to get "a good Mexican meal and a stiff margarita." Yeah, it was hard to get any good étouffée in New Orleans given the E. coli. The president should find that little bullhorn from ground zero, put it right on Brownie's ear and yell at him to get the heck out of there.

FEMA was a disaster waiting to happen, the minute a disaster struck. As The Washington Post reported Friday, five of the eight top FEMA officials were simply Bush loyalists and political operatives who "came to their posts with virtually no experience in handling disasters."

While many see the hideous rescue failures as disaster apartheid, Barbara Bush and other Republicans have tried to look on the bright side for the victims. The Wall Street Journal reported that Representative Richard Baker of Baton Rouge was overheard telling lobbyists: "We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn't do it, but God did."

Even those who believe in intelligent design must surely agree that Brownie and Representative Baker weren't part of it.

POSTED BY:

Martin S. Friedlander, Esq.

www.freedompost.typepad.com

LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH COMPACT FOR THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS

In HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP., ___ U.S. ___ (1994)  Justice Ginsburg delivered this analysis of the creation of the "Port Authority of New York and New Jersey" Louisiana and Mississippi, working with Congress, should consider adopting a bi-lateral compact similar to the Port Authority of NY and NJ. It might solve some of the "financing" problems arising out rebuilding New Orleans, with protection from future calamities of nature an "inaction" by government"

The relevant portion of Justice Ginsburg's decision is reprinted here.

The Port Authority, whose Eleventh Amendment immunity is at issue in these cases, was created in 1921, when Congress, pursuant to the Constitution's Interstate Compact Clause, 4 consented to a compact between the Authority's parent States. 42 Stat. 174. Through the bi-state compact, New York and New Jersey sought to achieve "a better co-ordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the port of New York." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-1 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6401 (McKinney 1979). The compact grants the Port Authority power to

"purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within [the Port of New York D]istrict; and to make charges for the use thereof; and for any of such purposes to own, hold, lease and/or operate real or personal property, to borrow money and secure the same by bonds or by mortgages upon any property held or to be held by it." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-7 (West 1990); accord, N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6407 (McKinney 1979). [ HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 5]  

The Port Authority's domain, the Port of New York District, is a defined geographic area that embraces New York Harbor, including parts of New York and New Jersey. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-3 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6403 (McKinney 1979). 5  

"The Port Authority was conceived as a financially independent entity, with funds primarily derived from private investors." United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 4 (1977). Tolls, fees, and investment income account for the Authority's secure financial position. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a-61a. 6  

Twelve commissioners, six selected by each State, govern the Port Authority. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-5, 32:12-3 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6405 (McKinney 1979); 1930 N. Y. Laws, ch. 422, 6. Each State may remove, for cause, the commissioners it appoints. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-5, 32:12-5 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6405 (McKinney 1979); 1930 N. Y. Laws, ch. 422, 4. Consonant with the Authority's geographic domain, four of New York's six commissioners must be resident voters of New York City, and four of New Jersey's must be resident voters of the New Jersey portion of the Port of New York District. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-5 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6405 (McKinney 1979). The Port Authority's commissioners also serve as PATH's directors. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-35.61 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6612 (McKinney 1979). [ HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 6]  

The governor of each State may veto actions of the Port Authority commissioners from that State, including actions taken as PATH directors. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-17, 32:1-35.61, 32:2-6 to 32:2-9 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6417, 6612, 7151-7154 (McKinney 1979). Acting jointly, the state legislatures may augment the powers and responsibilities of the Port Authority, see N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-8 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6408 (McKinney 1979), and specify the purposes for which the Port Authority's surplus revenues are used. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-35.142 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7002 (McKinney 1979).

Debts and other obligations of the Port Authority are not liabilities of the two founding States, and the States do not appropriate funds to the Authority. The compact and its implementing legislation bar the Port Authority from drawing on state tax revenue, pledging the credit of either State, or otherwise imposing any charge on either State. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-8, 32:1-33 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6408, 6459 (McKinney 1979).

The States did agree to appropriate sums to cover the Authority's "salaries, office and other administrative expenses," N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-16 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6416 (McKinney 1979), but this undertaking is notably modest. 7 By its terms, it applies [ HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 7]   only "until the revenues from operations conducted by the [P]ort [A]uthority are adequate to meet all expenditures." The promise of support has a low ceiling: $100,000 annually from each State. Thus, the States in no way undertake to cover the bulk of the Authority's operating and capital expenses. Further, even the limited administrative expense payments for which the States provided are contingent on the advance approval of both governors, see ibid., and the States' treasuries may not be tapped until both legislatures have appropriated the necessary funds. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-18 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6418 (McKinney 1979). A judgment against PATH, it is thus apparent, would not be enforceable against either New York or New Jersey.

C

The Third Circuit's assessment of PATH's qualification for Eleventh Amendment immunity conflicts with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the same matter. See Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 873 F.2d 628, 631 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990). The Second Circuit concluded:

"No provision [of the compact or of state legislation pursuant to the compact] commits the treasuries of the two states to satisfy judgments against the Port Authority . . . . We believe that this insulation of state treasuries from the liabilities of the Port Authority outweighs both the methods of appointment and gubernatorial veto so far as the Eleventh Amendment immunity is concerned." 873 F.2d, at 631. [ HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 8]  

We affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment in Feeney, but we bypassed the question whether PATH enjoyed the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990). Assuming, arguendo, that the suit in Feeney was tantamount to a claim against the States, 8 we ruled that New York and New Jersey had effectively consented to the litigation. See id., at 306-309 (relying on N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157, 32:1-162 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101, 7106 (McKinney 1979)). Consent is not arguable here, because Hess and Walsh commenced suit too late to meet the 1-year prescription specified by the States. See supra, at 2. Accordingly, we confront directly the sole question petitioners Hess and Walsh present, and we hold that PATH is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.

II

The Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in federal court without their consent, leaving parties with claims against a State to present them, if the State permits, in the State's own tribunals. Adoption of the Amendment responded most immediately to the States' fears that "federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin." Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); see also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 , n. 1 (1959); Missouri v. [ HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 9]   Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933). 9 More pervasively, current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system:

"The Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890). It thus accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federation." Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. ___ (1993) (slip op., at 7).

Bistate entities occupy a significantly different position in our federal system than do the States themselves. The States, as separate sovereigns, are the constituent elements of the Union. Bistate entities, in contrast, typically are creations of three discrete sovereigns: two States and the federal government. 10 Their mission is to address "`interests and problems that do not coincide nicely either with the national boundaries or with State lines'" - interests that "`may be badly served or not served at all by the ordinary channels of National or State political action.'" V. Thursby, Interstate Cooperation: A Study of the Interstate Compact 5 (1953) (quoting National Resources Committee, Regional Factors in National Planning and Development 34 (1935)); see Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Cooperative [ HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 10]   Federalism, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 825, 854-855 (1963) (Compact Clause entities formed to deal with "broad, region-wide problems" should not be regarded as "an affirmation of a narrow concept of state sovereignty," but as "independently functioning parts of a regional polity and of a national union.").

A compact accorded congressional consent "is more than a supple device for dealing with interests confined within a region. . . . [I]t is also a means of safeguarding the national interest . . . ." West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951). The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey exemplifies both the need for, and the utility of, Compact Clause entities:

"From the point of view of geography, commerce, and engineering, the Port of New York is an organic whole. Politically, the port is split between the law-making of two States, independent but futile in their respective spheres. The scarcity of land and mounting commerce have concentrated on the New York side of the Hudson River the bulk of the terminal facilities for foreign commerce, while it has made the Jersey side, to a substantial extent, the terminal and breaking-up yards for the east- and west-bound traffic. In addition, both sides of the Hudson are dotted with municipalities, who have sought to satisfy their interest in the general problem through a confusion of local regulations. In addition, the United States has been asserting its guardianship over interstate and foreign commerce. What in fact was one, in law was many. Plainly the situation could not be adequately dealt with except through the coordinated efforts of New York, New Jersey, and the United States. The facts presented a problem for the unified action of the law-making of these three governments, and law heeded facts." Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 [ HESS v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 11]   Yale L. J. 685, 697 (1925) (footnote omitted). "

This lawyer has been intimately involved with the "sovereign immunity" issues set forth in Hess, having sucessfully sued the Port Authority for violation of the "civil rights" of my client. This lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. I even spent 5 days in the offices of the Port Authority in the now destroyed World Trade Center taking depositions of the heads of the Port Authority. It brings back memories and a solution to the New Orleans problem.

I would appreciate my readers contacting legislative leaders in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Congress so that they may consider my idea for "salvation".

Editorial comments by:

Martin S. Friedlander, Esq.

www.freedompost.typepad.com

CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT AMONG LOUISIANA. AND MISSISSIPPI

The United States Constitution provides for a Compact between Two or More States. An example of such a Compact is "The Port of New York and New Jersey Authority". New York and New Jersey formed the "Port Authority" by a "compact" (contract) between the two states. They then submitted that contract to the United States Congress for approval. It was approved. It has the legal force of a "Treaty". It is in force, and it has worked extremely well. See some of the US Supreme Court cases dealing in the "Port Authority". One of these cases held that since the "Port Authority" is "self sustaining" it is not subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. These legal authorities will be submitted on request.

The "Port Authority" using that "Constitutional" mandate, built the bridges, tunnels, airports, and railroads service the bi-state area. They are "self-supporting" through the imposition of "tolls" or "fees" to use these services. These fees are essentially a "consumption tax". That should get the attention of Forbes Magazine.

Now that we have committed ourselves to rebuild New Orleans, we have an opportunity to establish a "similar" "compact" to govern the Port of New Orleans.

The Mississippi River drains 1/3 of the United States. It is the most important route of commercial commerce in America. New Orleans gives its' right of "passage" away for nothing. Everyone benefits, while New Orleans and its people "starve."

The new Port of New Orleans Authority would have the right to collect "tolls" from all "shipping" going up and down the Mississippi, passing through New Orleans. The tolls, would be in essence a "consumption or use tax" imposed on those who use the facilities. Why should New Orleans, or for that matter the United States, build and maintain the "levees", "canals", "bridges", "railroad hubs" and "airport terminals" for nothing. Those who use should pay. The Port Authority of New York collects a toll from every user of its bridges, railroads, ports, tunnels, and airports. These tolls and fees gave New York the financial base to build the World Trade Center. We can call this facility the New Orleans World Trade Center. It works and it is self-supporting.

Let me have your comments and discussion on this absolutely "new" proposal.

Martin S. Friedlander, Esq.

www.freedompost.typepad.com