By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Baghdad
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the
political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is,
by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents
for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans,
with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome,
can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this
counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and
noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading
back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the
conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the
mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day.
(Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as
official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in
Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered
framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are
offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space”
remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with
actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda
terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This
situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and
Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been
trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.
A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one
American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal
armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint
and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American
investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the
triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their
own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the
incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would
have killed their families.
As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports
that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can
be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion
commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the
thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of
command, who are really loyal only to their militias.
Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi
armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our
tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have
against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form
their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al
Qaeda.
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a
counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center
that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become
effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their
loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself
working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is
justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the
Americans leave.
In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies
and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground
remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this
fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army
Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a
“time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected
to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United
States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this
context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground
require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of
lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an
American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers
to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a
resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the
local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take
this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly
insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce
normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we
continue to arm each warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet
political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass
in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing
no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from
arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be
surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible
while the military situation remains in constant flux.
The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the
Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members.
The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its
people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling
against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what
they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority.
The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since
the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us
something useful for the moment.
Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they
believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best
to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation
risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct
the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling
of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of
government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have
committed to support.
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our
insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi
terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the
political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please
every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers.
The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to
please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we
are hated by all in the long run.
At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency,
improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we
have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in
bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced
and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity,
telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated
communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with
a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we
would consider normal.
In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets,
engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four
years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we
have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist,
militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of
average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can
hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us
a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free
food.”
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released
Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of
their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain
dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force
our withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let
Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced
policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve
their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be
defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies
to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.
Buddhika Jayamaha
is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is
a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant.
Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.
Mr.Bush, choke on this revelation from our "Troops" whom we support and want home.
Comments by Martin S. Friedlander, Esq.
Posted August 21, 2007 | 10:24 PM (EST)